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Abstract
This paper examines the estimation and interpretation of models with endogenous
treatment effects in labor economics. We argue that the two conventional methods of
estimation, control functions and instrumental variables, are closely related and
thus many of the issues raised with respect to the control function procedure are
equally relevant to instrumental variables estimation. We also argue that the
economic significance of arbitrary econometric specifications in these models is much
greater than currently acknowledged. We also show that the severe restrictions
regarding sorting behavior imposed by instrumental restrictions can be easily relaxed
in estimation. Finally, we show that the various tests of endogeneity associated
with these estimators are based on the same population moment.
We are gra[eful to Jim Brown, Whitney Newey, Trevor Breusch, Adrian Pagan and Bertrand
Melenberg for helpful discussions. This paper was partially written while Vella was a
visitor in the Department of Statistics, The Faculties and the Department of Economics,
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. We alone are
responsible for any remaining errors.I
1. Introduction
Empirical implementations of the Roy (1951) sorting model have proliferated the labor
economics literature since the seminal work of Heckman (1979) on estimating models with
sample selection bias. Recently this research has extended to the identification of
"treatment effects" although many of the estimation issues remain unchanged (see, for
example, Heckman and Robb 1986 and Heckman and Hotz 1989). A major feature of this
literature is the ability to draw insightful economic inferences regazding sorting
behavior from the estimated parameters of the model.
This paper addresses several issues relating to the estimation and interpretation of
these models. First, we argue that the two popular methods of estimating these models,
instrumental variables and control function estimators, are more closely linked than
commonly treated. This is an important issue as many of the criticisms of the control
function procedures are not levied at the instrumental vaziable approach although they
are equally relevant. With respect to interpretation we claim that despite the
instrumental variable estimator's weaker distributional assumptions, it imposes several
restrictive constraints on the nature of the implicit sorting behavior. Furthermore, we
argue that many of the arbitrary exclusion restrictions employed in these procedures for
identification purposes have more economic significance than acknowledged. Finally, we
show that the tests of selection bias and union endogeneity are based on different sample
estimates of the same population moment.
Throughout the paper we employ the example of the union impact on wages as a vehicle
of illustration although many of our points have wider applicability. We do this for two
reasons. First, several papers (see Robinson 1989a for a recent survey), have examined
the union impact on wages via these estimation procedures. Second, despite these papers
it appears that many of the important implicit estimation and economic issues remain
misunderstood. The following section describes the model and the estimators. In section
3 we outline the relationship between the control function and instrumental vaziables
estimators. Sec[ion 4 discusses the economics implicit in the estimation procedures. We
also propose a simple test for the validity of the instrumental variables estimator based
on instrumental variables estima[ion. In section 5 we outline the relationship of the
exogeneity tests. Section 6 concludes. Throughout the paper we assume the stochastic
components of the model are normally distributed. Our primary aim is to show the
relationship between two "competing" estimators and discuss the implicit economic issues
rather than examine the relative merits of competing estimation procedures under
different parametric circumstances.2
2. A Si~nultaneous Model of Wages and Union Membership
It is common practice to account for the endogeneity of union membership when evaluating
the impact of union membership on wages. A recent paper, Robinson (1989a), provides an
excellent survey of this literature and a coherent discussion of the relationship between
the estimators and the economics of union membership. We argue that the two conventional
ways of estimating the union impact from cross sectional data, (instrumental variables
(IV) and control functions (CF)), estimate the same measure of union impact although they
are constructed to produce different estimates. Consider the following simple model of




where W, is the log of individual i's wage; Xi is a vector of exogenous variables; ~u and
a~N are parameters to be estimated; Eui and ENi are random disturbances drawn from a
normal distribution with non zero covariance; and the U and N subscripts denote union and
non-union sector, respectively. Following Robinson, assume that the union effect
operates through different intercept terms and combine equations (1) and (2) in the
following manner
(3) Wi-éNf(áU-óN)UifX7-FVi 1-1,...,n
(~1) V -E i'(E -E )1J 1-1,...,n
i Ni Ui Ni i
where U, is an indicator dummy denoting union membership. Also introduce equations
capturing the cost of union membership and the index determining union membership
(5) Ci-SatECi i-1,...,n
(Ó) L-W -W -C -ZR~E; E,-E -E -E 1-1,...,n
Ui Ni i i i i Ui Ni Ci
where C. can be interpreted as the cost of union membership; S. is a vector of exogenous
variables; Ii is a latent variable reflecting gain from union membership; Ui-1 if Ii 10
and Ui-O otherwise; S and n are vectors of parameters; and Eci is a normally distributed
error term potentially correlated with Eui and ENi. Zi is the vector of all exogenous3
variables in the system.
The OLS estimate of zP-(a~c-a~N) from (3) is biased if U, and V., conditional on X., aze
cottelated. A consistent estimate of xP is the generalized IV estimator r~n, obtained
by OLS from
(8) W-rN f U,xP f X~ t n
where U. is the linear prediction~ of U, given Z. and n. is a zero mean error term. rP
has the interpre[ation of the return to union membership to an individual who is randomly
assigned to a union. Identification of rP and estimation of (8) requires at least one
regressor in Z. which is not contained in X.. An alternative consistent estimate is
obtained through the control function methods of Heckman (1979) and Lze ( 1978) which
exploit the assumption of joint normality of the ettor terms. The conditional
expectation2 of an individual's wage is
(9) E[W,IU~-áN~ X.2' ~ U.7P f
À~U,6UE t ~1,1-UieNE
where e is equal to P IP2 and e is equal to P IP2 where P and P are the
UE UE E NE NE E NE UE
covariances betWeen E. and EN., and E, and E~, respectivety, and PÉ lS the variance Of
E.; and a.-E[E.~U.]. To estimate (9), we require an estimate of a. and this is given by
~ ~ ~ ~
the inverse mills ratio from (6). Note that a. is also known as the generalized residual
for the probit model (see Gourieroux et.al 1987 and Vella 1993), given by
(10) E[E.~U]-a.-[1-U]{-m(-Zn)~~(-Za)]}fU.[m(-Zn)I{1-à(-Zn)}]
where ~(.) and m(.) represent the probability density and cumulative distribution
functions of the standard normal distribution evaluated at the values inside the
parentheses~. The estimable form of (9) can be written as
~ This instrumental variables estimator is employed for simplicity. A more general IV
estimator is discussed in Heckman and Robb (1986), where X; and a known
transformation of a variable in S; are used as instruments.
z The conditional expectations in the sequel are also conditional upon Z;.
3 The log likelihood function for the union equation in (6) is
n
L z~[ Ulog á(Z,a)-~ (1-U) log {1-~(Zn)} ]
~-i
and the estimates for n are defined by the first order conditions4
(11) W.-xN f Ua'P f Xa' -~ xiUieUEfai(1-U)eNE f vi
where v is a zero mean crror lerm uncorrelated with the regressors. To implement this
procedure we estimate (fi) over the n observations by probit maximum likelihood to obtain
n, generate (l0) at the probit estimates and insert the generated values into (11) and
estimate by least squares. Unlike the instrumental variables estimator it is not
necessary to include something in Z, which is not in X. as the mapping from Z. to a~ is
non-linear. a~P reflects the return to random assignment to union membership. The e's,
combined with a., capture the individual random effects which vary across individual.
3. The Relationship Between Instrumental Variables and Control Function Estimators
IV and CF procedures generally produce estimates of the union differential that are
comparable (see Robinson 1989a). However, under certain parametric assumptions the CF and
IV estimates are identical by construction. Consider the intuition behind this result.
It is well known that the endogeneity of regressors can be accounted for by replacing the
endogenous regressor in the primary equation with its predicted value from an auziliary
regression, or including both the endogenous variable and the residual from this
auxiliary regression. As the inverse mills ratio is the "residual" from the probit model
the link between the control function and instrumental variable methodologies is
immediately apparent.
However as this result requires the residuals to be a linear function of the
regressors this exact relationship dces not hold for a.. To show the exact relationship
consider a variant of the Heckman two step approach which is referred to as a linear
control function. Substitute the OLS residuals from regressing U. on Z., e.-U.-U., in
place of a..4 This gives
án - ~ ~ U~Z~~I
m(-zn)I(l-m(-Zn))it(1-U.)z~{-~(-zn)~(a(-z,r)) } ] - 0.
~-i
Using the definition of Gourieroux et. al (1987) that the generalized residual for
the probit model is the derivative of the log likelihood funchon with respect to the
intercept evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates it is straightforward to
establish that the inverse mills ratio is the generalized residual for the probit
model.
a This procedure is suggested by Olsen (1980) which illus[rates that under certain
parametric assumptions this procedure generates consistent estima[es of ~P. Heckman
and Hotz (1989) refer to this procedure as a linear control function as the first5
(12) W;-yN t U.yP f Xti f N-U)e f
n~
and where OLS on (12) reproduces y~rv as an estimate of yP. Now substitute the least
squares residual with the inverse mills ratios
(I3) W;-yNfUa~PtX.7faefv..
Estimating (13) by instrumental variables eliminates a., since ~a~ ~Z.-O from the first
order conditions of the probit model, and re-produces the instrumental variables
estimator y~rv. Estimating (13) by OLS however dces not eliminate a, and produces the
estimate y~F. This estimate is more efficient than y~rv due to the normality
assumption, and the non-linear mapping from Z, to ~., employed in the CF estimate but
ignored in the IV (see appendix). It is obvious from (12) and (l3) that the IV and CF
procedures produce identical estimates if a.-e.. This condition, however, will never be
satisfied under normality. However, for many applications the empirical correlation
ccefficient between a, and E. will be very highb and this explains the simílarity
obtained from the IV and CF ~approaches (see appendix). This similarity will also hold
when the true underlying distributions are not normal.
It is useful to consider the "economic" implications of the similarity between the CF
and IV procedures. First, the IV requirement for at least one additional regressor in Z.
indicates that while the CF approach can be internally consistent with individuals
sorting only on the basis of wages the IV approach cannot. That is, if costs and tastes
are truly irrelevant then only the variables which appear in X, should appear in Z..
This implies that the IV estimator would not be identified. Second, while a tremendous
deal of scrutiny is paid to exclusion restrictions in the first step probit, Z, is
typically specified in an arbitrary manner when employing IV. However, the similarity in
the two methods indicates that Z. should be chosen equally carefully whether CF or IV is
employed. In practice, however, IV is often preferred over CF on the basis that it is
easier to specify the instruments and [here is less concern about economic justification
step is a linear probability model. Note that in this case it is necessary that some
regressor wich appears in Z; is not in X;.
5 We set eUE-eNE in (13) for simplicity. We discuss the implication of this
restriction below.
6 In our experience, empirical correlation ccefficients using real life data are
usually in the range 0.99 - 0.9999.6
for inclusion in Z.. It is clear that both methods aze equally sensitive to the choice of
Z.. ~
~
Although IV and CF both provide consistent estimates in this model it is generally
true that IV in "typical" selectivity circumstances dces not. The conventional selection
bias model has wages only observed for the subset corresponding to U.-1 or U.-O although
the vector Z. and U. is observed for everyone. Suppose wages are only observed for the
union members. Thus the model to be estimated is
(la) Wu.- X.~u f e.u i-1...n~
(6) I. - Z.n -~ e. i-1. ..n ~ ~ ~
where n~cn. The control function procedure produces consistent estimates of ~xu from OLS
over the sample of union members after including the inverse mills ratio in (la).
However the instrumental variables estimator is no longer unbiased or consistent for a~u.
The reason is that Z. is no longer uncorrelated with a. for non-random subsamples. The
bias, see appendix, ~ is directly related to ~~ a Z. By noting that ~! ~ Z, are ~ i ~ ~ ~-i ~ ~
precisely the first order conditions from the probit model for union member observations
(see footnote 3) it follows that the bias of the IV estimate of zu is a weighted function
of the "distance" by which the first order conditions of the probit model, explaining
union membership, are violated over the sub-sample. Accordingly, this term will be zero
when evaluated over the entire n observations. However, in general they will be non zero
for non-random sub samples.
4. The Economics of Union Membership
Non zero values for euE and eNE indicate that the same unobserved influences upon an
individuals union status also have an impact on that individuals wage. The e's, and a.,
also capture the economics of union membership. First consider the case where
individuals sort solely on wages, i.e. costs are irrelevant. When PuN C 0, the case of a
comparative advantage structure, positive selection will produce a positive euE and a
negative 6NE. A hierarchical structure, characterized by o~uN ~ 0, suggests the better
workers, as measured by their endowments of ei and eN, will locate in the higher variance
uxtor and Ixisilivc u~Iection prexluccs a positive value fur at Icast une of the e's~.
These implications are far less dear when QN~ andlor vu~ are non zero and this is
~ Both e's will be positive when o~u ~PuN ~~N'discussed below.
An important point raised by Robinson (1989a, 1989b) is that the restriction required
for IV estimation, shown in (14) below, rules out the possibility of positive (or
negative) selection in both markets. While the assumption is restrictive it is incorrect
to conclude that it dces not allow positive sorting. The conditional expectation of the
ercor term V. from (3) has the following form
(14) E[V] - E[EN.~U.-O]Pr(U.-O) t E[EU.~U.-1]Pr[U.-1] - 0.
Robinson argues that as both probabilities are strictly non-negative this imposes
opposite signs on the conditional error means and thus rules out positive (or negative)
selection in both markets. The first part of this statement is true and is confirmed by
equation (10). The error terms for the respective sectors will have opposite signs by
construction. However, the sorting process dces not operate purely through the signs of
Eu, and EN.. AS is shown in equation (9) the sorting phenomena is also captured by euE
and eNEe. The statement by Robinson is true if a~uN~O ~d `uc-PNC-O, that is, if costs
are irrelevant in the sorting decision and the skills in the two sectors are negatively
corcelated. However, in general the statement is not true. Following Robinson rewrite
equation (14) as
(15) E[V ]- e -m(-Z;n)
~(-Za) t e m(-Z;~) (1-~(-Z.n)) - 0
i NE ~ - ~rt UE -~ - ~[ ~
and simplify to get
(16) E[V] - (-BNE}eUE) ~(-Z1[)-O.
Condition (16) is necessary for IV to be consistent. That is, eNE-euE implying
au-PUNPuc-PUN-PN~NC'
Consider where costs are irrelevant implying o~u}PN-2PUN-0. For
this to be satisfied a necessary condition is o~uN~O. That is, the ercor structure must
have a hierarchical structure implying the better union workers would also make the
better non-union workers9. This imposes positive estimates for both coefficients. More
e It is possible to infer the sign of the e's from Eu, and EN. whenever the sign of
E, is unique to the sector. However, while this is satisfied in the 2 sector model
it clearly cannot be for 3 or more sectors.
9 Robinson (1989a) refers to Robinson and Tomes (1984), where the ccefficients on theH
importantly, it also implies that Eu, and EN, are perfectly correlated. This is much
stronger than what is required for hierarchical sorting. [t indicates that the
performance in one sector is a sufficient statistic for performance in the other. It is
useful to note that the CF procedure also imposes this constraint when the e's are set
equal in estimation.
The restrictive nature of IV is due to the implicit restriction it imposes. While the
CF approach generally estimates both e's separately IV implicitly imposes their equality.
Robinson suggests one solution to this is to allow the value in (14) to equal some
constant k rather than zero. This appears to be a satisfactory solution only if we are
interested in 2P. An alternative approach is the following. Consider equation (17)
where we do not restrict euE and eNE to be equal. This gives
(17) W. - 7N f U.a~P, f Xy f E B. f(1-U)E BNE ~ V
where e- is the coefficient for the common random effect and eNE is the ccefficient for
the additional random effect for union sector. It is straightforward to show that the
estimate of eNE is obtained from the regression
(18) W. - 7N ~ U.~P -(1-U.)U BNE ~- E,9. -F V
where a component of the random effect is captured by eNE. That is, the union effect for
a union worker can differ from that of a non-union worker. ~P continues to represent the
return to random assignment to union membership while holding the random effects
constant. More importantly, the t-test on eNE is a test of the equality of the euE and
eNE and is thus a test of the instrumental variables approach. This test is more
convenient than that proposed by Robinson (1989a) as it is conducted within the IV
framework~o.
Now consider where costs are relevant in the sorting decision and are correlated with
either andlor both union and non-union productivity. Consistency of the instrumental
selection terms in the respective union and non-union samples are both positive, as
evidence that the IV estimator is inappropriate. However, the IV estimator requires
both ccefficients to possess the same sign which is inconsistent with positive
sorting in the comparative advantage structure. The positive ccefficients reported
in Robinson and Tomes do not refute the use of the IV estimator as suggested by
Robinson.
~o Robinson proposes testing the IV restriction by estimating the e's separately via
the CF framework and testing their equality.9
variables estimator requires, after minor rearrangement, Pu}PN-2PUN}PNC~uc-O. When
PuN~O a necessary condition for (16) is Puc~`NC' This is similaz to a condition
discussed in Robinson (I989b). However note that the difference i~ these later
covariances must dominate the sum of the variances and covariances of the wage errors.
In economic terms this appears to be a condition which is very unlikely to be satisfied.
Thus the comparative advantage model appears to be inconsistent with the IV approach.
Note, however, that as PU}`N-2PUN is strictly non-negative even the hierarchical
structure model requires PUC, PNC'
It is useful to extend this discussion of interpretation of the e's to the control
function approach which provides unrestricted estimates of the respective e's. When the
costs are irrelevant to the model or are uncorrelated wi[h the respective productivity in
the two sectors it is possible to assign the interpretation of various types of sorting
to the model. However, if we recall that PuE-PU~uN~uc azd PNE-PUN~N~NC
it is
immediately apparent that unless the Puc and PNC are non consequentia] the signs of the
e's say nothing about the sorting in the model as any pair of signs is possible and
consistent with any type of sorting. [t is important to note that it is common practice
to specify the elements of Z, such that it includes at least one, if not several,
vaziables not found in X.. This implies that the role of non-wage considerations is
important in determining union membership and that the signs of the e's say nothing about
sorting.
While this later point may appear obvious we feel it is one which has been overlooked
in this literature. Consistent with the discussion related to exclusion restrictions the
interpretation of the e's must be in accord with the variables included in Z.. Attempts
to identify the model through exclusion res[rictions have subsequent implications for
economic interpretation.
5. Exu~cncity ~rests
One final issue is the testing of the endogeneity of union membership to wages. It is
well known that such a test is based on the parameters euE and eNE and, accordingly, is a
t-test on the ccefficient for the inverse mills ratio. However, what is less well known
is this is a Hausman test. To show the relationship between these tests we employ the
testing s[rategy of Newey (1985) and examine the implied conditional moments being
tested~ ~ .
~~ To employ the results from Newey (1985) it is necessary to assume that all
estimation is performed by maximum likehhood. This dces not change any of thelo
Retum to our original model and, for simplicity, set euE-eNE. The Hausman test is
based on testing whether U, has a statistically significant coefficient when included in
equation (3). The sample estimate of this is i~rva n'~E V.U, where V, is the least
squares residual from (3). However, it is well known that an equivalent test is based on
7nrv-n-~E V e.. That is, the Hausman test can be performed by including either the
predicted value of the endogenous regressor or the residuals from the reduced form as an
additional regressor in the primary equation. It is valuable to note that the
corresponding population moment is the covariance between the errors from the two
equations and this can be written as their product. That is, 7Hau.~n.n` ~VE~'
A test of selection bias in the CF framework is also a test of a non-zero covariance
between V and E and is also given by the conditional moment E[e.V ]-0. However, given
that the union equation has a censored dependent variable we condition on the form of the
censoring and the moment of interest becomes rHu~~n- E{E(V. ~ W)~E(e. ~ U)} where we
generate the error on the basis of the observability of the dependent variable. The
sample estimate of this quantity is given by the product of the sample estimates of the
errors (see Melino 1982, Pagan and Vella 1989, and Vella 1992). This is given by TcF'
n-~E V,a. recalling that E(e. ~ U.)-x.. As a, and e, are highly correlated the tests
~~ ~ ~ ~
should perform similarly when distributional assumptions are satísfied. What is of more
interest, however, is that the tests are based on the same population moment although the
sample estimates differ due to the censoring.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines several issues in [he estimation and interpretation of models with
endogenous treatment effects. We argue that the two conventional methods of estimating
these models, control functions and instrwnental variables, are more closely related than
commonly treated. We argue that many of the issues raised with respect to the
specification of the control function procedure are equally relevant to instrumental
variables estimation. We also find that the instrumental variables procedure implicitly
imposes restrictions on the nature of the sorting in the models. We find, however, that
these restrictions can be easily relaxed through the estimation of an additional
parameter within the instrumental variables framework. Finally we show that the various
tests of endogeneity associated with these estimators are based on the same population
moment.
relationships that follow although it would be not possible to compute the test in
the conditional moment framework unless maximum likelihood is employed.II
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Appendix:
In matrix form the model is given as
(Al) W-U2~PfXa~fV
(A2) I-ZnfE
Let P-Z(Z'Z)-'Z', where Z is the nxk matrix of exogenous variables (including an
z
in[ercept term).
Proposition 1: The OLS estimator of (13) is more efficient than the instrumental variable
estimator. In matrix form equation (13) has the form
(A3) W- Ua~P t X~ t ae t v.
Decompose (A3) into two orthogonal regressions by premultiplying by Pz and its orthogonal
complement M- 1- P. This gives two equations containing the same information as (A3). z z
(A4) P W- Xz f P Ua~ f P ae f P n- Xr f P Ua~ f P n.
r r. P r. z z P r.
(AS) M~W - MZUaP f Mzae f MZn.
OLS on (A3) produces the control function estimator a~~F, while OLS on (A4) reproduces
the IV estimator a~~rv. If a is not proportional to MZU the OLS estimate of ~P from (AS)
will differ from ~~w. Consequently, if the assumption of normality is correct, (AS)
will contain additional information on ~P improving the efficiency of the CF estimator
relative to the IV.
Proposition 2: The exact relationship between the estimators, for the model shown in
equations (A 1) and (A2), can be obtained using straightforward algebra from the following
results
(A6) a~~rv- (U'MxU - U'MZU)~~(U'MXW - U'MZW)
(A7) a~~F- (U'MxU - U'P~U)~~(U'MXW - U'P~W).
where Px-X(X'X)-~X', Mx - I- Px, and X denotes the exogenous variables in the wage
equation and recalling that X is a subset of Z. P~ denotes the projection onto a. If13
P~U - MZU both estimators are identical. As P~U - P~MZU - Ka for some constant K, the
estimators are different to the extent that Ka differs from MZU. As the inverse Mill's
ratio is highly correlated with the least squares residual, the similarity of the
estimates follows.
Proposition 3: The bias of the IV estimator in the conventional selectivity model is
proportional to the distances by which the first order conditions for the accompanying
selection equation are violated. Suppose wages are only observed for the union members.
Thus the model to be estimated is
(A8) W~-Xzufeu i-1...n~
(A9) I-Znte i-1...n
The GIV estimate of a~u from (A8) is given by (X'PZX) ~X'P~W. Thus E[au~U-1] -
(X'PZX)-~X'PzE[Wu ~ U- l], where the condition U-1 reflects we only include observations for
which U. - l. Substitution gives E[~u ~ U-1 ]-7u-~ (X'P~X)~X'P~E[eu ~ U-1] noting that
E[eu ~ U-1 ]- a where a is the vector of inverse mills ratios for the union members with
elements m(-Z.,r)I(1-ro(-Z,r)). Thus the bias of the IV estimate of a~u is
(A10) (X'P X) ~X'Z(Z'Z)-~Z'a ~
noting that the tenns Z'a are precisely the first order conditions from the probit model
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